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Diminishing Marginal Value 
 
Abstract 
  The notion of diminishing marginal value has had a profound impact on the development 
of neoclassical theory.  Early neoclassical scholars had considerable difficulty convincing 
contemporaries of the new paradigm’s value until political economists, including Jevons and 
Walras, used the critical assumption of diminishing marginal value to link utility and demand.  
While diminishing marginal value remains a key component of modern economic intuition, there 
is surprisingly little empirical verification of its existence or level.  This paper gathers field data 
across a myriad of subject pools—from undergraduate students to PTA members to sportscard 
enthusiasts—to examine several aspects of preferences in both price and exchange institutions.  
Examining behavior of nearly 900 subjects across several treatments, we find strong evidence of 
diminishing marginal value.  
 
   2
Diminishing Marginal Value
1 
The assumption that having more of a good will lead an individual to place a lower value 
on an additional unit of that good – which we call diminishing marginal value – is a pervasive 
component of economists’ beliefs about human behavior.  Robert Frank, summarizing this 
intuition, writes that “the more one consumes of something, the less one is willing to pay to 
obtain more of it.  Even a hungry person would be willing to pay less for a second sandwich than 
for the first.”
2 
This concept was highly influential in the development of economic thought.  Initiated in 
the 1870s, the “Marginalist Revolution” represented such a severe break from the prevailing 
approaches that many contemporaries reasoned that the new paradigm was “quackery” because it 
lacked a direct connection between utility and demand.  Combining the critical assumption of 
diminishing marginal value with equivalent marginal utilities (per dollar spent) across goods, 
H.H. Gossen (1854) initially made this connection.
3  Jevons (1871) later independently 
developed his own results linking demand and utility, making use of diminishing marginal 
utility.  Other figures in the Marginalist School also frequently appealed to diminishing utility; 
Walras wrote: “The want which we have for things, or utility which things have for us, 
diminishes gradually as consumption increases.”  Jevons wrote: “Each increment of food is less 
necessary, or possesses less utility, than the previous one.” 
This presumption of diminishing marginal value was based on its plausibility and 
intuition, not specific empirical evidence.  Our goal is to fill this gap.  This objective requires us 
to be more precise about what is being measured.  Early writers wrote in terms of diminishing 
                                                           
1We thank Ted Gayer, Glenn Harrison, and John Worth for helpful comments. 
2Frank suggests that this intuition applies to “ordinary” goods.   3
utility.  In this paper, we look at diminishing marginal value (DMV) where value is measured in 
terms of either (i) money or (ii) another good that must be exchanged for the good in question.  
Note that the link between preferences and demand has been considerably refined since the 
nineteenth century; we focus here directly on the idea expressed by Jevons and Walras, which 
formed the germ of early economic progress.   
To test for DMV, we conducted three types of experimental treatments.  The first set of 
treatments uses a standard willingness-to-accept format and examines whether the compensation 
an individual requires to give up a unit of some good decreases when the individual has more of 
that good.  This is a money-based measure of diminishing marginal value and it has the most 
general applicability.  Economists are interested in knowing, for example, whether 
environmental improvements become more valuable as environmental quality deteriorates.   
Since an environmental improvement typically requires a “general sacrifice” that might best be 
measured in money terms, a money-based measure of diminishing marginal value (for 
“environmental quality”) is most informative for making the necessary inference. 
In a second set of treatments we examined subjects’ willingness to trade one unit of an 
endowed good for one unit of another good.  We gave our experimental subjects different 
amounts of the endowed good.  Diminishing marginal value means that more individuals are 
willing to make a trade when they have more of the endowed good.  This is a goods-based 
measure of DMV.  This formulation comes closer, we feel, to the kind of exchange situation that 
the early writers envisioned.  Furthermore, it enables us, with some additional experiments, to 
trace out a demand curve, thereby roughly following the early linkage.   
The properties of the utility function are most interesting for public goods since these are 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
3Diminishing marginal utility came well before Gossen, however.  For example, Bernoulli employed the concept to   4
goods for which demand curves are usually missing.  Policy decisions should be made on the 
basis of the values that people place on the goods being provided; policies should be consistent 
with these values or, if this consistency were to fail, be reconsidered.  In a dual sense, we can 
also look to policies to see the values that they imply.  In this context, DMV manifests itself 
clearly in the U.S. in the Endangered Species Act, which places a high implicit value on a 
species when its population is low enough to be labeled “endangered,” and a much lower implicit 
value when the population is above this threshold.  DMV is also implicit in the Clean Air Act, 
which imposes stricter standards on plants locating in areas with high levels of certain air 
pollutants than in areas that meet ambient air quality standards; in other words, the lower the air 
quality, the higher the (implicit) marginal value of possible improvements (or deterioration).   
In this regard, it is interesting to consider how non-DMV would manifest itself.  The 
U.S.’s Office of Management and Budget, which issues guidelines for benefit-cost analysis, 
species a value-of-a-statistical-life that is identical across situations; that is, independent of the 
baseline mortality of the affected population.
4  This implies constant marginal value.
5  T h e  
Wilderness Act prohibits road-building in designated wilderness areas, which must be roadless to 
qualify for such designation.  This is increasing marginal value: pristine areas are prohibited 
from receiving new roads, while highly-roaded areas are subject to additional roads with many 
fewer restrictions.  The broader policy issue, and the one that underlies are our examination of 
DMV, is whether the (marginal) value of environmental quality goes up as environmental quality 
deteriorates.  The alternative, non-DMV possibility is that people quickly adjust to any 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
solve the St. Petersburg Paradox.   
4These guidelines have been recently changed to specify benefits in terms of quality-adjusted life-years (QALY), but 
the value-per-QALY remains independent of the age of the population being affected.   
5Constant-marginal-value policies present something of a dilemma for understanding of the prevalence of DMV – 
Do such policies reflect underlying preferences of the citizenry or are they better characterized as bureaucratic 
convenience?   5
deterioration of the environment, and that their willingness to pay for environmental 
improvement is unaffected by the “background” environmental quality. 
Although a true policy-relevant field experiment is impossible to conduct, we designed a 
third set of treatments to test whether DMV is exhibited in a collective choice setting.  In these 
treatments, subjects were endowed with one good and asked whether they were willing to trade it 
for one unit of another good; however, the trade would take place only if a majority of subjects 
agreed to it, and all subjects would be required to trade their good in that case.  We tested for 
DMV by changing the endowment of the initial good for all subjects and examining whether 
more individuals were willing to vote to make the trade when they had more of the initial good. 
The evidence we find for DMV is strong.  In the money-based treatments, which elicited 
a continuous measure of value, all possible comparisons show a decrease in the value of the 
items as the endowment of the good in question increased.  We find consonant results in the 
exchange treatments: increases in the endowment significantly increased subjects’ willingness to 
trade part of it away (i.e., the trading rate) in all of our treatments, in both individual choice and 
collective choice situations. 
Previous research has largely been content to find demand curves that are consistent with 
an underlying utility function.  What is at stake in our research is a more explicit connection 
between a utility-based view of behavior and a demand-based view.  In Section 3 of the paper we 
report a set of demand-curve experiments that we then link to the DMV results using a specific 
utility function.  If we allow for a reference-point effect, then these experiments show demand 
curves that are highly consistent with the DMV behavior we previously uncovered. 
   6
2.  Experimental Design and Results 
Our treatments fall into three categories based on whether value is measured in terms of 
money or another good and, for the goods-based experiments, whether there is individual or 
collective choice.  Within each category, we statistically test for diminishing marginal value, 
using subjects who are randomly allocated into one treatment cell.   
A.  Treatments Involving Goods-Money Tradeoffs 
Our first set of treatments was carried out with subjects in suburban Washington D.C. in 
the mid 1990’s.  We conducted seven treatments with thirteen different subject groups, all but 
one of which were local civic groups.  Each group began with one of seven different 
endowments of goods consisting of mugs and flashlights.  Each subject’s compensation 
demanded (CD), also known as willingness-to-accept, was elicited for different parts of that 
endowment using an open-ended format, the Becker-deGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism.   
Our treatments are summarized in Appendix A. 
Experimental Procedure.  To illustrate the general approach, we describe the procedure 
for Treatment C in detail. Each subject was given one mug and three flashlights.  We first asked 
subjects to consider selling back the mug.  Each participant was asked to write down the 
minimum payment he or she would accept for selling the mug back to us; this is his 
compensation demanded.  We then repeated the following BDM procedure three times for 
practice and then for a real transaction.  The administrator drew an offer price randomly out of an 
envelope.  If the subject’s compensation demanded was higher than the offer price, the subject 
kept his mug.  If his compensation demanded was less than or equal to the offer price, he 
returned his mug to us and received a check for the randomly drawn price.  All subjects were 
offered the same price.   7
Next, we asked subjects to consider selling back their flashlights.  Each subject wrote 
down the minimum payments he or she required to be willing to sell us back one, two, and three 
flashlights.  We then randomly drew a piece of paper that stated the number of flashlights (per 
person) we would be buying back.  Subjects were told each option had equal probability.    
We then randomly drew the offer price.  For example, we might first randomly draw the 
instruction to buy back two of each subject’s three flashlights and then draw an offer price of 
$19.00.  This is a price for the two flashlights, not a per-flashlight price.  Subjects who had 
offered to sell two flashlights for $19.00 or less then turned in two of their flashlights and 
received a check for $19.00.  They kept their remaining flashlight.  Subjects who had offered to 
sell two flashlights for more than $19.00 kept all three flashlights and received no money.   
In our experiments, subjects were not told the distribution of offer prices, a design feature 
that makes our mechanism different from the BDM mechanism as it is most frequently 
administered.  In particular, we did not tell subjects what the upper limit of the distribution was, 
i.e., the highest potential offer price.  Concealing this information was useful to us for two 
reasons.  First, it emphasized to subjects that distribution information should be irrelevant in their 
responses; that is, it helped reinforce our instruction that their best strategy is to determine and 
report their compensation demanded regardless of what they believe about possible offer prices.  
Second, it gives the subjects no information about what anyone else (i.e., the experimenters) 
believes might be likely values for CD.  The latter feature is obviously important in studying 
“true” preferences. 
Although the BDM mechanism is theoretically incentive-compatible, questions have been 
raised about its performance.  Harrison pointed out that the costs to subjects of not reporting their 
true values are small.  Rutström found that values elicited by a slightly different version of the   8
BDM were different from English and Vickrey auctions, both also incentive-compatible.  Such 
issues, however, should not be significant for examining differences in behavior across the same 
type of experiment, as done here.  
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1.  The table presents, for each treatment, the 
mean compensation demanded, standard error, and sample size.  We used the procedures 
discussed in Horowitz and McConnell (2000) to identify responses that were likely not to 
represent true preferences; see Appendix A for the number of observations analyzed in each 
treatment. 
  Several treatments used endowments of two different goods as a way of helping subjects 
become familiar with the BDM mechanism, as the above discussion explains.  Therefore, in 
these treatments we first test whether compensation demanded to give up a good depends on the 
endowment of the other good, rather than it depending just on the endowment of the same good, 
which is the essence of our DMV test.   
  In performing this test, we adopt the null hypothesis that the compensation demanded for 
a particular item is independent of the endowment of the other item.  There are six tests: C versus 
G (CD for 1 mug); E versus F (CD for 2 mugs; CD for 3 mugs); E and F combined versus A (CD 
for 2 mugs; CD for 3 mugs); and D versus F (CD for 1 flashlight).  Results strongly suggest we 
should not reject the null hypothesis; the t-values are 0.05, 0.04, 0.12, 0.35, 0.20, and 0.27, 
respectively.  These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the compensation demanded 
for a good is independent of the endowment of other goods.  
Results.  Testing for diminishing marginal value relies on an examination of data between 
treatments.  In each comparison, we test whether the mean compensation demanded for a good is 
lower in the treatment where the subjects have more of that good.  We tested this hypothesis for   9
the mean compensation demanded for one mug; two and three mugs; and one flashlight.   
Endowments were, respectively, one, three, or four mugs; three or four mugs; and one or three 
flashlights.  Results are presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4. 
  The pattern of responses is clear.  All five adjacent pairs of values show CD declining as 
the endowment increases, a clear demonstration of diminishing marginal value.  The null 
hypothesis of no difference is rejected in three of six tests.   
  Results are even more striking in the individual treatments.  There are eleven possible 
treatment comparisons: C vs. A, G vs. A, and A vs. B (one mug); A vs. B, E vs. B, and F vs. B 
(two and three mugs); and D vs. C and F vs. C (one flashlight).  All eleven of these reveal 
compensation demanded decreasing in the endowment.    
  To examine the joint null hypothesis of no diminishing marginal value, we construct the 
following test.  Suppose that in a comparison of any two treatments there is a 50-50 chance that 
one of the values (mean compensation demanded) will be higher than the other.  In other words, 
consider a null hypothesis that when A is compared to B, the probability that {mean CD in 
treatment A} > {mean CD in treatment B} is ½; likewise, the probability that {mean CD in 
treatment B} > {mean CD in treatment A} is ½.  Under the null, the probability that n 
independent comparisons will show {mean CD in lower-endowment treatment} > {mean CD in 
higher-endowment treatment} in all n cases is thus (½)
n.  
  To ensure that probabilities are independent, we compare any two treatments only once.  
This leaves seven possible pairs.
6  Under the null, the probability that we will observe 
diminishing marginal value in all seven is (½)
7 = 0.0078.  Thus, the hypothesis of no diminishing 
                                                           
6These are C vs. A, G vs. A, and A vs. B (one mug); E vs. B, and F vs. B (two mugs); and D vs. C and F vs. C (one 
flashlight).  Since all eleven pairs show diminishing marginal value, it does not matter which ones we include when 
restricting the test to only one pairwise comparison per treatment.       10
marginal value is rejected at the 99 percent level. 
B.  Individual Choice Treatments Involving Goods-Goods Trades 
In an effort to provide a test of diminishing marginal value in a different setting, we 
recruited subjects from a real-world marketplace – the floor of a sportscard show in a large 
southern U.S. city in April 2001 – and observed their willingness to trade unique commodities.
7  
This set of treatments is similar in spirit to the field experiments reported in List (2001).  In the 
treatments reported in this section, we observe trading patterns of sports memorabilia and 
examine whether varying the initial endowment level influenced subjects’ willingness to execute 
a trade.   
The design is uncomplicated.  A subject is initially given an endowment of good a (or b) 
and has the option to trade with the experimenter a fixed amount of that endowment for a 
specified amount of good b (or a).  The trading rate is the proportion of participants who decide 
to execute the trade.  A separate group of subjects is endowed with a higher amount of a and 
given the same opportunity to trade (1 unit of a for 1 unit of b; only one trade per subject.)  
Subjects exhibit DMV for good a if the trading rate is higher for subjects with a higher 
endowment of a.  Note that this closed-ended format (“yes/no”) is simpler than the open-ended 
format used by the BDM mechanism.  Knetsch (1989) and Kahneman et al. (1990) have used 
similar mechanisms to test for endowment effects. 
Our test uses two unique goods.  Good a was a June 14, 1996, Kansas City Royals game 
ticket stub, which was issued for admission to the baseball game in which Cal Ripken Jr. broke 
the major league record for consecutive games played.  Good b was an October 12, 1997, Tampa 
Bay Buccaneers game ticket stub, which was issued for admission to the football game in which 
                                                           
7In a very different setting, Smith (1982) and Plott (1986) find that market institutions matter.   11
Barry Sanders surpassed Jim Brown to become the fourth all-time rushing leader in the history of 
the National Football League.  We were fortunate to obtain these unique pieces of sports 
memorabilia in quantity because one of the authors attended the sporting events and collected the 
ticket stubs from in and around the stadiums.  Although we have rarely seen the goods sold in 
markets, in certain regions (e.g., Ripken in Baltimore and Sanders in Detroit) the stubs have sold 
for $40 each. 
The procedure follows List (2001).  The administrator asked subjects entering the trading 
card show if they would fill out a demographic survey that would take about 5 minutes.  If the 
candidate subject agreed, then he or she was given an initial endowment as “payment” for 
completing the survey.  Upon completion of the survey, the administrator retrieved the other 
good from under the table and informed the subject that she had the opportunity to trade.  The 
subject was allowed to inspect both goods, after which she either made the trade or kept the 
original bundle.  The endowment was changed at the top of each hour, so subjects’ treatment was 
determined based on the time they visited the table at the card show.  No subjects participated in 
more than one treatment.  We summarize our experimental treatments in Appendix A.   
Results.  Trading rates are reported in Tables 5 and 6.  Table 5 contains the results for 
subjects who started with the Ripken stub and had the option to trade for a Sanders stub.  Table 6 
contains results for subjects who started with the Sanders ticket stub. 
Both sets of treatments show strong evidence of diminishing marginal value, as there is a 
substantial increase in trading rates when endowment levels are increased.  When subjects had 1 
unit of endowed good a, 9 out of 40 subjects (22.5 percent) will willing to trade for a unit of b.  
When subjects had 3 units of a, 31 out of 40 subjects (77.5 percent) were willing to trade one 
unit for one unit of b, a greater than tripling of the trading rate.  Similar results occurred when b   12
was the endowed good.   
To test this observation more formally, we calculated Irwin-Fisher z-statistics (which are 
distributed normally) to determine whether the observed differences between the treatments are 
statistically significant.  We find that in both comparisons {H vs. J} and {I vs. L}, the larger 
endowment induced a significantly higher trading rate at the p < .01 level (z = -4.92 for the 
Ripken endowment and z = -5.42 for the Sanders endowment).  These results are consistent with 
those from the treatments using a goods/money tradeoff and suggest that DMV is prevalent 
across alternative choice situations. 
C.  Collective Choice Treatments 
  An understanding of DMV may have its most important implications for goods that are 
exogenously supplied, such as public goods.  Consider the case of environmental policy, where 
the prevalence or lack of DMV seems particularly important.  Suppose current environmental 
quality is q0 and that deterioration of ∆q can be prevented by a project that costs c, and that a 
majority of individuals is just indifferent to this tradeoff; they are willing to pay at most c to 
prevent this deterioration.  Next, suppose that quality actually deteriorates to q0-∆q.  Under 
DMV, a clear majority of the public will now support this project (i.e., be willing to pay c) to 
prevent any further deterioration (to q0-2∆q).  If DMV fails – say, if marginal value is constant – 
society might choose not to prevent this deterioration; that is, it might choose to allow 
deterioration when environmental quality is at a low level, even though it would have been just 
indifferent to preventing the same amount of deterioration when quality was at some higher 
level.  In the case of increasing marginal value, a worsening of environmental quality would 
make environmental protection less valuable, rather than more.  This pattern goes against 
economists’ intuition about preferences, but is not far-fetched as a real-world reaction.   13
  In this context, understanding individual behavior in a collective choice setting represents 
an important extension of the results presented above.  To provide a test of DMV within this 
realm, we replicated the private good trading treatments with a collective choice analog.  These 
treatments are identical in terms of endowments and feasible trades, as illustrated in Appendix A,  
but now the decision was cast in terms of the “funding” of a public good.  If more than 50 
percent of the subjects voted in favor of funding the public good, then all subjects had to turn in 
the requisite payment and the public good would be provided.  If less than 50 percent voted in 
favor of the public good, then all subjects kept their initial endowment and the public good was 
not provided.   
We were careful to design a public good that would share some of the important 
characteristics of public goods in the field.  We therefore asked participants to fund “Mr. 
Twister,” a small metal box placed at the front of the room.  When Mr. Twister’s handle is 
turned, it distributes one ticket stub.  If the group chooses to fund Mr. Twister (i.e., more than 50 
percent of subjects vote to fund it), then all ticket stubs are turned in and the box’s handle is 
cranked N (number of subjects in the room) times and N ticket stubs (of the other type) are 
delivered.  Since it was necessary to have group decision-making, instead of running these 
treatments on the floor of the sportscard trading show we used an adjacent room in the same 
building.   
Results. Results are presented in Tables 7 and 8.  Again, there is strong evidence of 
diminishing marginal value.  In Table 7, 14 out of 40 subjects (35 percent) voted to trade their 
one Ripken stub for one Sanders stub when their endowment was one Ripken stub.  More than 
double that proportion (28 out of 35 subjects, or 80 percent) voted to make that trade when their 
initial endowment was three Ripken stubs.  Similar behavior occurred when subjects started out   14
with one or three Sanders stubs, as shown in Table 8. 
We again calculate Irwin-Fisher statistics to test whether these differences are significant.  
We find that there is a significant difference in trading rates for both types of goods – subjects 
traded significantly more often when they were endowed with three units than when they were 
endowed with one unit (z = -3.92 for Ripken and z = -5.06 for Sanders).  
D.  Evidence from Willingness-to-Accept/Willingness-to-Pay 
  DMV is closely related to the relationship between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-
accept.  To see the precise connection, let utility be  ) , ( b a u  and let ∆ > 0 be a proposed change in 
the good.  Consider the constructs: 
(1)     ) , ( ) , ( 1 b B A u B A u − ∆ + =  
(2)     ) , ( ) , ( 2 b B A u B A u − = ∆ −  
From equation (1), b1 is the amount of b the individual is willing to pay for ∆ of a when her 
endowment is {A,B}; b2 is the amount she is willing to pay for ∆ when her endowment is {A-
∆,B}.  DMV for good a means b2 > b1 for all ∆.  The analogous set-up for b is: 
(3)     ) , ( ) , ( 1 ∆′ + − = B a A u B A u  
(4)     ) , ( ) , ( 2 B a A u B A u − = ∆′ −  
DMV for good b means a2 > a1 for all ∆΄.  Note that DMV for one of the goods does not imply 
DMV for the other good.
8 
  Willingness-to-accept (WTA, also known as Compensation Demanded) being larger than 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) is a form of DMV.  This connection should not, of course, be 
surprising since the difference between WTA and WTP depends on changes in the consumer’s 
                                                           
8DMV in both goods implies preference quasi-concavity.  Quasi-concavity, however, implies only that there must be 
DMV in at least one good.     15
endowment, as pointed out by Kahneman et al., among others.   
  To see that the WTA/WTP disparity is a form of DMV, consider the mixed direct-
indirect utility function defined by v(q,y) = maxx u(x,q) subject to px = y, where x is a vector of 
market goods, q is the rationed good, and y is income; the vector of prices, p, is usually 
suppressed.  Let ∆1 > 0 be a proposed change in the rationed good.  WTP and WTA are given by: 
(5)     ) , ( ) , ( 1 WTA y q v y q v + ∆ − =  
(6)       ) , ( ) , ( 1 y q v WTP y q v ∆ − = −  
  Use the analog to (4) to define ∆2: 
(7)     ) , ( ) , ( 2 y q v WTA y q v ∆ − = −  
DMV in income means ∆2 > ∆1.  Thus,  ) , ( 2 y q v ∆ − < ) , ( 1 y q v ∆ − = ) , ( WTP w q v −  or, from (7), 
WTA > WTP.  In other words, WTA > WTP is DMV in the “other good”; in this case, income.  
Although the disparity between WTA and WTP has long been recognized as an income effect, 
the emphasis on this income-based perspective has appeared relatively recently (Bateman et al.; 
Morrison; Sugden; Horowitz and McConnell.)  This perspective can also be easily appreciated 
by recognizing that DMV (measured in dollars) and the disparity between WTA and WTP both 
disappear when the marginal utility of income is constant.
9 
  Our experiments have measured changes in the value of a good when the endowment of 
that good changes.  In contrast, the ratio WTA/WTP measures changes in the value of a good as 
income changes.  This ratio will be greater than one whenever marginal value is increasing in 
income.  This latter property is, of course, intuitively appealing in much the same way as DMV.    
  Cross-sectional inconsistency of preferences.  Our experiments have presented clear 
                                                           
9One way to see this is to assume constant marginal utility for money; i.e., no income effect.  Let utility be v(q,y) = 
f(q) + y.  Then it is easy to see that WTA=WTP, and this will be true regardless of the curvature of f(q).   16
evidence in favor of DMV.  But a comparison across tables (Table 5 vs. 6; Table 7 vs. 8) also 
provides evidence about the “cross-sectional inconsistency” of preferences, which has potentially 
much greater implications.  Consider a comparison between treatments H and I.  For preferences 
to be consistent, the proportion of people who choose b over a should be equal to one minus the 
proportion who choose a over b.  Ditto for the comparison between N and O.  In words, subjects 
should exhibit the same preference for a over b regardless of which good they have in hand.  
This prediction clearly fails in our trading exercises. 
  Note that preferences can fail in this way and still exhibit DMV, and vice versa, and 
therefore we leave the implications of this phenomenon for a separate paper.  It will be necessary 
to deal with this phenomenon in the following section, however.   
 
3. Utility and Demand 
A.  Demand-Curve Treatments 
  A further set of treatments with different trading prices provides data that can be used to 
construct demand curves.  These are demand curves denominated in goods, relevant for a simple 
two good economy.  Subjects were endowed with 3 units of either a or b.  In treatment J, already 
described, the subject could trade one unit of a for one unit of b, so the price of the non-endowed 
good, b, is 1 (only one trade allowed per subject.)  In K, the subject must trade two units of a for 
one unit of b, so the price of b is now 2.  In treatments L and M, the subjects were endowed with 
3 units of b; the price of a was 1 in treatment L and 2 in treatment M.   
We expect a lower trading rate as the price rises.  Results are shown in Tables 9 and 10. 
Results show demand curves that are clearly downward sloping.  In both cases the treatment with 
a higher price for the good being “bought” had a significantly lower proportion traded.   17
B. Linking Utility and Demand 
In this section we link demand and utility using our results.  Consider the utility function: 
(8)  ) ln( ) 1 ( ) ln(
0 0 B B A A − − + − α α  
where α, A0, and B0 are parameters.  Note that we expect α > 0.5 since the data show a slight 
preference for good a over good b.   
Budget constraints for each of our treatments are shown in Table 11. To convert trading 
decisions to “consumption,” we calculated items per 100 subjects.  For example, in treatment J, 
100 subjects would begin with 300 a.  Thus, the budget constraint is A+B ≤ 300.  If the trading 
rate were 77.5 percent then those 100 subjects would end up with 222.5 a and 77.5 b.  
An appropriate scale is also needed for A0 and B0.  The endowment effect requires us to 
recognize that this scale may be specific to each treatment, dependent on both the endowment 
and framing of the decision problem.  We set the baseline for the endowed good at βY, where Y 
is income, and the baseline for the non-endowed good at γY.  An endowment effect implies β > γ; 
a finding of β = γ implies no endowment effect.  This format is arbitrary but useful.  Our main 
goal here is to construct a model that provides a transparent role for endowment effects yet is 
also well-behaved as a model of choice and demand in all other regards.  Values for A0 and B0 
based on this approach are shown in Table 11.   










α α + − − =
0 0 ) 1 ( * 
Results.  We used data from experiments H through M to estimate (9) using maximum 
likelihood methods.  Estimated parameters and approximate standard errors are α = 0.56 (0.04),   18
β = 0.60 (0.05), and γ = 0.12 (0.04).  Actual and predicted values for choice variables are shown 
in Table 12.  These results show a high degree conformity with observed choices, although we 
recognize that such an assessment is necessarily qualitative.   
The hypothesis β = γ is rejected at above the 99 percent level.  Since  γ β ˆ / ˆ ≈ 5 in our 
experiments, being endowed with a good makes the good roughly 5 times more valuable than not 
being so endowed. 
As we have noted, previous research has largely been content to find well-behaved 
demand curves, while the underlying behaviors such as DMV have been largely unexplored.  
Our calculations yield a joint model of DMV and demand, provided we make allowance for an 
endowment effect.
10   
 
4.  Concluding Comments 
DMV is an historically important idea that helped lead the early neoclassicists to adopt a 
utility-based model of behavior, although it is not “the” link between utility and demand in a 
theoretical sense, and early historians appear to have conflated it with other relevant concepts.  
This property remains, for modern economists, a widely assumed behavioral feature, often the 
core of our intuition – indeed, it is often difficult to imagine behavior without DMV.  Yet, the 
empirical evidence for it has remained unexplored and untested.  This gap has clearly needed 
redressing.   
                                                           
10Gary Becker (1962) took a different approach to this question.  He argued that economic theory (mainly, 
predictions based on downward-sloping demand) is “much more compatible with irrational behavior than had been 
previously suspected” (p. 2), a claim that we corroborate but using a different argument.  His notion of rational 
behavior consisted of a “well-ordered [utility] function” (further specified in terms of “consistency” and 
“transitivity”).  In a reply to a critic (Becker 1963), he noted that “diminishing marginal utility (or marginal rate of 
substitution)” cannot apply if consistency and transitivity fail.  In contrast, we posit an inconsistent individual who 
nonetheless has diminishing marginal value (although inconsistency, too, has taken on a slightly different meaning 
over the years.)    19
In our tests, the range of endowments being valued is small.  Such small ranges provide 
powerful tests of our hypothesis.  They do not, however, allow us to predict behavior under 
larger endowments.  We also have looked at only three types of goods, while we expect the 
effect of the endowment on marginal value to be different for different goods.  Economists will 
be most interested next, we feel, in knowing which kinds of goods are likely to have strong 
DMV and which are likely to have constant marginal value or even increasing marginal value.  
We leave these questions for a subsequent paper.    20
 
Table 1.  Summary Statistics for Treatment Set I 
  Treatment 
  A B C D E F G 











-- -- --  $5.06 
(0.80) 
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Table 2.  Mean Compensation Demanded for 1 Mug, by Endowment 
  Mug Endowment: 
  1 
















Entries are the mean, standard error, and number of observations.  **Significantly different from column 





Table 3.  Mean Compensation-Demanded for 2 and 3 Mugs, by Endowment 
  Mug Endowment: 
  3 
(Treatments A, E, F) 
4 
(Treatment B) 
Compensation Demanded to 







Compensation Demanded to 







Entries are the mean, standard error, and number of observations.  **Significantly different from 
column to the right at the 99% level.     21
 
 
Table 4.  Mean Compensation-Demanded for 1 Flashlight, by Endowment 
  Flashlight Endowment: 
 1 
(Treatments D, F) 
3 
(Treatment C) 
Compensation Demanded to 












Table 5.  Trading Rates (a for b), by Endowment 





Percent traded (1 unit of a for 1 unit of b) 22.5  77.5 






Table 6.  Trading Rates (b for a), by Endowment 





Percent traded (1 unit of b for 1 unit of a) 27.5  87.5 






Table 7.  Trading Rates for Collective Choice (a for b), by Endowment 





Percent voting to trade  










Table 8.  Trading Rates for Collective Choice (b for a), by Endowment 





Percent voting to trade  









Table 9.  Trading Rates (a for b), by Price  (Endowment of a = 3)  















Table 10.  Trading Rates (b for a), by Price  (Endowment of b = 3) 
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Table 11.  Budget constraints and reference points  
Treatment Budget  constraint  A0 B 0 
H  A+B = 100  100β 100γ 
I  A+B = 100  100γ 100β 
J  A+B = 300, A ≥ 200  300β 300γ 
K  A+2B = 300, A ≥100  300β 300γ 
L  A+B = 300, B ≥ 200  300γ 300β 








Table 12.  Predicted vs. Actual Choices 
Treatment Predictions:
 





H 76  77.5 
I 28 27.5 
J 227 222.5
 
K 207  205 
L 84 
  87.5 
M 50  42.5 
aAll numbers normalize the number of subjects to 100.     24
Appendix A:  Summary of Experimental Treatments 
 
Treatment  Subjects  # Subjects  # Analyzed  Endowment   
Private good with price elicitation 
A  Undergraduate students  37  36  3 mugs  
 PTA  10  6  3  mugs   
 PTA  26  19  3  mugs   
 
B  Parents of Swim Club  52  48  4 mugs  
 PTA  20  19  4  mugs   
 
C  Parents of Cub Scouts  30  26  1 mug, 3 flashlights   
  Lions’ Club  42  34  1 mug, 3 flashlights   
  PTA  27  24  1 mug, 3 flashlights*   
  PTA  50  48  1 mug, 3 flashlights*   
 
D  “Mothers of Multiples”  18  15  1 flashlight, 3 different mugs 
 
E  PTA  41  41  1 mug, 3 mugs* 
 
F  PTA  27  27; 25  1 flashlight, 3 mugs*   
 
G  PTA  50  50  1 mug, 3 binoculars   
 
 
Private good with exchange mechanism 
 
H  Sportscard consumers   40  40  1 Ripken stub   
I   Sportscard consumers  40  40  1 Sanders stub   
J  Sportscard consumers  40  40  3 Ripken stubs   
K   Sportscard consumers  40  40  3 Ripken stubs   
L   Sportscard consumers  40  40  3 Sanders stubs  
M   Sportscard consumers  40  40  3 Sanders stubs  
 
Public good with exchange mechanism 
 
N  Sportscard consumers   40  40  1 Ripken stub   
O Sportscard  consumers  37  37  1 Sanders stub   
P  Sportscard consumers  35  35  3 Ripken stubs   
Q   Sportscard consumers  33  33  3 Ripken stubs   
R   Sportscard consumers  42  42  3 Sanders stubs  
S   Sportscard consumers  35  35  3 Sanders stubs  
 
*In these treatments, compensation demanded was elicited only for returning 2 or 3 items out of the 3-
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